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Abstract
This paper studies sabotage in tournaments with at least three
contestants, where the contestants know each other well. Here, every
contestant has an incentive to direct sabotage speciﬁcally against his
most dangerous rival. In equilibrium, contestants that choose higher
productive eﬀort are sabotaged more heavily. This might explain ﬁnd-
ings from psychology, where victims of mobbing are sometimes found
to be overachieving. Further, sabotage equalises promotion chances:
in an interior equilibrium it is a matter of chance who will win, even
when contestants diﬀer a lot in their abilities. This, in turn, has
adverse consequences on who might want to participate in a tourna-
ment. Since better contestants anticipate that they will be sabotaged
more heavily, it may happen that the most able stay out and the
tournament selects one of the least able with probability one. Several
extensions are studied, for example, easy victims, diﬀerent prize struc-
tures, and handicaps. Further, implications for the optimal design of
tournaments and, more generally, career tracks in organisations, are
considered.
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11 Introduction
Labor market tournaments have the double role of selecting the most able
individuals and supplying incentives. Although many economists have voiced
the opinion that the selection aspect is at least as important as the incentives
aspect (e.g. Rosen 1986, Schlicht 1988, Glazer and Hassin 1988), the focus
of the bulk of research has clearly been on the latter. This paper explicitly
addresses the selection aspect. The question is whether tournaments, and
more generally relative comparison contests, tend to select the most able in-
dividuals. Since there is usually an irreducible component of luck in winning
a tournament, the relevant question is not whether the most able will always
win, but rather whether they have the greatest chances of winning.
In most tournament models, it is clearly the case that more able con-
testants have a greater chance of winning.1 But the picture changes radically
once we take into account that tournaments - like other relative comparison
contests - give each contestant an incentive to sabotage his rivals (Lazear
1989). Here “sabotage” is a catchall term for diﬀerent kinds of activities
that are intended to hinder the productive eﬀorts of other contestants. These
range from strategic withholding of information, less mutual help, outright
forms of mobbing, and actual physical sabotage.
There is one obvious problem in using a tournament for selection in the
presence of sabotage. The result might be the promotion of the best sabo-
teur who might be not very good at working productively - and promoting
the best saboteur is not necessarily in the interest of the ﬁrm. This is a
particularly striking example of the more general point that ability is a mul-
tidimensional property, and that the abilities and personality traits needed
to win a tournament are not always the same as those needed at a higher
level in a hierarchy.
This paper focusses on a more subtle point. It starts with two observa-
tions. In many real world tournaments, there are more than two contestants
who compete for a single prize. And the contestants often know each other
well, especially if they work together closely and regularly. Then each contes-
tant knows who is his most dangerous rival. Intuitively, sabotaging a strong
rival improves one’s own chance of winning more than sabotaging a weaker
rival does. Therefore, each contestant has an incentive to sabotage this rival
1Lazear and Rosen (1981), Nalebuﬀ and Stiglitz (1983), Green and Stocky (1983),
Rosen (1986).
2most ﬁercely.
I show, in a tournament model with linear production functions which is
very close to the classic model of Lazear and Rosen (1981), that the result of
this eﬀect is an equalization of winning probabilities. In an interior equilib-
rium of a tournament between at least three contestants, each contestant has
t h es a m ec h a n c eo fw i n n i n g .I no t h e rw o r d s ,w h ow i l lw i nt h et o u r n a m e n ti s
a matter of pure chance, even if some contestants are much more able than
other contestants.
In fact, the selection properties of tournaments may even be much worse.
Since the most able individuals are sabotaged most, they may well have a
lower expected utility from participating in the tournament. Once we take
into account that participation in a tournament is endogenous, it turns out
that only the least able individuals may want to participate. In that case, a
tournament selects one of the least able with probability one.
Having derived these results, I go on to consider some extensions. As a
robustness check, I consider risk aversion and more general production and
cost functions. An especially interesting case is when some contestants are
“easy victims” (easier to sabotage than others). I show that easy victims are
sabotaged more heavily and have lower chances of winning the tournament.
Another set of extensions concerns the tournament design. I study a
diﬀerent prize structure, when there are n − 1 equal winner prizes, and only
the contestant with the lowest output gets loser prize which is strictly smaller.
Here, the incentives to sabotage are very diﬀerent than in the case of only
one winner prize. In any pure strategy equilibrium, every contestant will
sabotage only one of his rivals. Moreover, there is one contestant (“the
victim”) who is sabotaged by all his rivals, and has the least chance of getting
one of the prizes. Obviously, if the contestants have identical cost functions,
anyone might be the victim. By continuity, even if the contestants diﬀer in
their abilities, one of the more able ones might turn out to be the victim.
Therefore, there is no guarantee that on average better contestants will be
selected by this kind of tournament.
I also consider competitive handicaps (as proposed by Lazear and Rosen
1981). I show that contestants who beneﬁt from the handicap are sabotaged
more heavily, whereas the contestants who are disadvantaged by the handicap
are sabotaged less. In an interior equilibrium, it is still a matter of pure
chance who wins. However, now existence of interior equilibria depends on
the size of the handicaps as well as on the diﬀerences in ability.
3Some evidence on sabotage
Since sabotage is usually illegal, it is diﬃcult to test the importance of
sabotage empirically. Nevertheless, there is considerable evidence for the
importance of sabotage. Some anecdotal evidence is given by the following
quotation (cited from Murphy 1992, fn. 4):
John Dvorak, PC Magazine editor (September 27, 1988) explains how
a friend received his promotion: “He managed to crack the network
messaging system so that he could monitor all the memos. He also
sabotaged the workgroup software and set back the careers of a few
computer naive souls who didn’t realize that someone was manipulat-
ing their appointment calendars. They would miss important meetings
and be sent on wild-goose chases, only to look like complete buﬀoons
when they showed up for appointments that were never made.”
More importantly, Drago and Garvey (1998) use survey data to test the
basic model of sabotage in tournaments due to Lazear (1989)). They ﬁnd that
when promotion incentives are strong, contestants tend to help each other
less, corroborating Lazear’s model.2 Recent evidence from experimental eco-
nomics also underlines the importance of sabotage in tournaments. Harbring
and Irlenbusch (2002, 2003) ﬁnd that the contestants tend to sabotage each
other even more than one would expect on the basis of the game theoretic
analysis. However, none of these papers directly addresses the question who
will be sabotaged most ﬁercely.
There is a huge literature from psychology on bullying and mobbing in
the workplace (see Einarsen et al. (eds.) (2003) for a survey). It is generally
agreed that bullying is a multifaceted fact. Part of the behavior under inves-
tigation seems to be related to sabotage in tournaments. For example, Zapf
and Einarsen (2003, 172) write that “Bullying due to micropolitical behavior
indicates harassment of another person in order to protect or improve one’s
own position in the organization.” Vartia (1996) ﬁnds that competition for
tasks and advancements and competition for the superior’s favour and ap-
proval belong to the most often perceived reasons for bullying - which ﬁts
nicely to the tournament literature. See also and Björkvist et al. (1994) who
2There are also papers using data from sports that give some empirical support to
Lazear’s model, see Becker and Huselid (1992) (auto racing) and Garicano and Palaciios-
Huerta (2000) (European soccer).
4ﬁnd that experienced reasons to harassment were predominantly envy and
competition about jobs and status.
In some studies, victims of bullying in the workplace are found to be
“overachieving”: more achievement oriented, punctual, accurate and consci-
entious than the control group (Zapf and Einarsen 2003, 178). While this is
often explained with regard to group norms, the present paper oﬀers another
explanation. As I show below, people that choose higher productive eﬀort
are sabotaged more heavily. The reason is that they are more dangerous
rivals in a contest for promotion.
Another ﬁnding is that victims of bullying tend to be more vulnerable
than the control groups, e.g. “low in social competencies, bad conﬂict man-
agers, unassertive and weak personalities” (Zapf and Einarsen 2003, 174ﬀ).
I capture this in a stylized way by considering the role of easy victims.
Related literature
The incentives to sabotage were pointed out early in the tournament liter-
ature (Nalebuﬀ and Stiglitz 1983, p. 40). The present paper is most closely
related to Lazear (1989) and Chen (2003). Lazear considered the optimal
tournament reward structure from the incentives aspect and showed that, in
the presence of sabotage, the optimal prize structure is compressed. How-
ever, Lazear does not discuss the possibility of directing sabotage speciﬁcally
against stronger rivals and the implications of this for the selection proper-
ties. Chen (2003) also studies sabotage in selection tournaments. However,
he is mostly concerned with the fact that some contestants may have a com-
parative advantage in sabotaging. My paper complements Chen’s in several
ways. Since Chen only considers the case of decreasing returns to sabotage,
he does not get the result that winning probabilities are equalized. Moreover,
Chen does not consider the participation decision, does not discuss easy vic-
tims, and considers only the case of a single prize. On a more technical level,
Chen’s analysis assumes the existence of interior equilibria. An additional
contribution of my paper is that I derive necessary and suﬃcient conditions
for the existence of interior equilibria for the case of a quadratic cost function.
Other papers that study sabotage include Drago and Turnbull (1991) (who
study how bargaining between workers about eﬀort and mutual help aﬀects
optimal incentive schemes), Chan (1996) (who studies external recruitment
as a means of keeping sabotage incentives low) and Kräkel (2000) (who con-
siders the eﬀect of relative deprivation in tournaments with sabotage).
Sabotage-like activities have been studied in other contexts as well. Shu-
5bik’s (1954) model of a “truel” (three person duel) is closely related to the
present paper. Here the “truelist” with the lowest shooting ability may have
the best chances of survival. The reason is that the contestants have an in-
centive to shoot at the truelist who is the best shot. Baumol (1992) considers
sabotage in the process of innovation. Skaperdas and Grofman (1995) and
Hess and Harrington (1996) model negative campaigning in election races.
Konrad (2000) studies sabotage in rent seeking contests. Auriol et al. (2002)
show that, when the principal cannot commit to long term contracts, career
concerns in teams give the agents incentives to sabotage, even if they are not
involved in a tournament scheme. The results of the present paper are also
relevant to these other contests.
In addition,the paper also contributes to the small but growing literature
on the selection properties of tournaments and other kinds of contests. One
important paper in this literature is Rosen (1986), who studied a sequential
elimination tournament. Meyer (1991) works out how to design a repeated
contest between the same contestants in order to get the most information
about the contestants. Clark and Riis (2001) study a selection tournament
i nt h ec a s ew h e r ep e r f o r m a n c ed e t e r m i n i s t i c .T h e ys h o wt h a tb ym a k i n gt h e
winner prize depend on which of two test standards are passed, the tourna-
ment can be designed to select the most able contestant as a winner. However,
they do not consider sabotage. Hvide and Kristiansen (2003) consider risk
taking in a selection contest. This literature contrasts with the statistical
theory of selection (e.g., Gibbons, Olkin and Sobel 1977) in that equilibrium
eﬀects are important and lead to new, and often surprising, conclusions.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets out the model. Section
3 studies how sabotage equalizes promotion chances. Section 4 considers
the decision whether to participate in a tournament. Section 5 discusses
extensions. Section 6 considers implications for the design of tournaments,
and section 7 concludes.
2T h e m o d e l
There are n contestants. For simplicity, the contestants are assumed to be
risk neutral but this is not crucial. Contestant i chooses his productive eﬀort
xi and his sabotage eﬀorts si1, ...,si(i−1),s i(i+1),...,sin,w h e r esij denotes the
sabotage of contestant i against contestant j. He has a personal cost of doing









where ci : R2 → R is is a twice diﬀerentiable function that is increasing in
both arguments and convex. Note that the function ci can be diﬀerent for
each contestant i.
The output produced by contestant i is given by3
qi = xi −
X
j6=i
sji + εi. (2)
Here εi is an error term. The εi are identically and independently distributed
with PDF f. Let F denote the CDF corresponding to f. I assume that f has
full support and is strictly log-concave.4
The cost functions are known to all the contestants. This simplifying
assumption captures the idea that work colleagues often know each other
pretty well, while their superiors know considerably less about them.
The contestant with the highest output gets a winner prize w which rep-
resents the monetary equivalent of a promotion. All the other contestants
get a strictly lower loser prize which is normalized to zero. Let pi denote
contestant i’s probability of winning. Then his payoﬀ is








Contestant i maximizes ui subject to the non-negativity constraints xi ≥ 0
and sij ≥ 0 for all j 6= i.
3One could also model the heterogeneity of the contestants by using alternative pro-
duction functions. For example, one could assume qi = βixi − γi
P
j6=i sji + εi, where
βi and γi are player i’s ability in working and sabotaging, respectively, or the additive
speciﬁcation qi = βi + xi −
P
j6=i sji + εi .T h i sw o u l dn o ta ﬀect the main results of the
paper.
4The assumption of log-concavity is fulﬁlled by most commonly studied distribution
functions, see Bagnoli and Bergstrom 1989. Log-concavity of the PDF implies unimodality
of the PDF; in fact, log-concavity is equivalent to strong unimodality, see Ibragimov (1956)
and An (1998). It will become clear in the proofs of lemmas 1 and 2, that the assumption
that f is everywhere log-concave is suﬃcient, but strictly speaking not necessary, for the
results of the paper.
7Let us brieﬂy review the case two contestants. Contestant 1 wins if
x1 + s12 − x2 − s21 >ε 2 − ε1.
Let G denote the CDF of the diﬀerence ε2 − ε1. Then
p1 = G(x1 + s12 − x2 − s21)
and p2 =1− p1. Hence the marginal beneﬁt of working and sabotaging are












for all x1,x 2,s 12,s 21.
In equilibrium, a contestant that has both lower marginal cost of working
and lower marginal cost of sabotaging will work harder and sabotage more.
Consequently, he will have better chances of winning the tournament. Of
course, this does not mean that someone who is better at working produc-
tively will win more often - his rival might be much better at sabotaging.
Still, if these abilities are positively correlated, the tournament can be used
to select better contestants.
This is not true if n ≥ 3. This case, on which I will focus for the rest
of the paper, is radically diﬀerent, due to the fact that each contestant has
several rivals and can choose which one to sabotage most ﬁercely.
To analyze the case n ≥ 3,d e ﬁne











Note that yij = E (qi) − E (qj). Hence yij can be interpreted as the deter-





[Πj6=iF (yij + εi)]f (εi)dεi. (3)
The following lemma makes precise the intuition that sabotaging a strong
rival improves one’s own chance of winning more than sabotaging a weaker
rival does.




l6=j slj >x k −
P
l6=k slk







The main intuition behind lemma 1 is as follows. By sabotaging j, con-
testant i increases the probability that he will win against j. But winning
against j is beneﬁcial for i only if contestant i simultaneously wins against
all other contestants, including k. B u ti ti sm o r el i k e l yt h a ti wins against k
when xk −
P
l6=k slk is small. The assumption that f (z) is everywhere log-
c o n c a v ei ss u ﬃcient, but not necessary, for this intuition to carry over to the
formal model.5
3 Sabotage equalizes promotion chances
Lemma 1 has interesting implications for the question of whether the more
able contestants have greater chances of winning in equilibrium. Deﬁne an
interior equilibrium as a pure strategy equilibrium6 in which every contestant
sabotages all his rivals. Now we can state the ﬁrst main result of the paper.
Proposition 1 In every interior equilibrium, every contestant i =1 ,...,n
wins with the same probability pi = 1
n.
Proof. Assume that in a pure strategy equilibrium i sabotages all his
rivals. If xj −
P
l6=j slj >x k −
P




∂sik. Now i can decrease sik by a small amount and, at the same time, increase
sij by the same amount. His cost is unchanged, but his probability of winning
is higher than before, so the initial situation cannot have been an equilibrium.
Therefore, we must have xj −
P
l6=j slj = xk −
P
l6=k slk for all j,k 6= i in an
equilibrium where i s a b o t a g e sa l lh i sr i v a l s .
5In fact, the weaker assumption that F (z) is log concave would be suﬃcient. (If the
PDF f is log-concave, so is the CDF F, but not vice versa - see An (1998).) Furthermore,
F (z) doesn’t have to be log-concave everywhere.
6Henceforth, I sometimes write “equilibrium” for “pure strategy equilibrium”. I do
not consider mixed strategy equilibria in this paper.




slj = xk −
X
l6=k
slk for all contestants j,k (4)
and hence p1 = ... = pn = 1
n.
Proposition 1 says that, in an interior equilibrium, who will win the tour-
nament is a matter of pure chance. The intuition behind the proposition is
simple: If (say) contestant 1 had a higher probability of winning than con-
testant 2, than it would be better for contestant 3 to increase s31 by a small
amount and, at the same time, decrease s32 b yt h es a m ea m o u n t .B yl e m m a
1, this would increase his chance of getting the promotion without changing
his costs.
As the following proposition shows, “overachievers” - contestants that
choose higher productive eﬀort - are sabotaged more heavily. As mentioned
in the introduction, this is in line with some recent results from psychology
on mobbing.
Proposition 2 In every interior equilibrium, contestants that choose a higher
productive eﬀort are sabotaged more heavily.





l6=k slk holds for all contestants j,k. There-





One can strengthen propositions 1 and 2, in that we do not have to restrict
attention to interior equilibria where literally all contestants sabotage all
their rivals. I show in the appendix that if at least one of the following
conditions holds in an equilibrium, then pi = 1
n for all i =1 ,...,n in this
equilibrium:
1. There are at least two contestants who sabotage all their rivals.
2. Each contestant is sabotaged by at least two rivals.
3. The contestants can be renumbered so that si(i+1) > 0 for i =1 ,..,n−1
and sn1 > 0.
10On the other hand, existence of equilibria with equal promotion chances
is not automatically ensured. There can be two types of corner solutions.
Firstly, there might be no sabotage at all in equilibrium. This is especially
likely when the marginal cost of the ﬁr s tu n i to fs a b o t a g ei sh i g h ,a n di f
the number of contestants is high (see Konrad (2000)). The reason is that
sabotage involves a positive externality to all the contestants except the one
w h oi ss a b o t a g e d .T h i se x t e r n a l i t yi sm o r ei m p o r t a n tw h e nt h e r ea r em a n y
contestants, and sabotage is therefore less attractive. Since the focus of this
paper is on tournaments where sabotage plays a role, I will assume that
∂ci(xi,0)
∂sij =0holds for all xi ≥ 0 and all contestants i,j (i 6= j). This ensures
t h a tt h e r ei ss o m es a b o t a g ei ne q u i l i b r i u m .
However, there can still be corner solutions of a second type. For example,
if there is one contestant (“she”) who is much better than all her rivals,
she will have a higher chance of winning in the equilibrium even though
only she is sabotaged by all the other contestants. In such a situation, it
doesn’t pay for the other contestants to sabotage anyone except her, so they
direct all sabotage against her. Intuitively, one would expect corner solutions
of this type if the contestants are very diﬀerent. Given the complexity of
the problem, it is very diﬃcult to derive general conditions for existence
of interior equilibria. However, some important lessons can be learned by
considering the following example.





















There are two types of contestants: l low cost contestants with γi =1 , and
h = n − l high cost contestants with γi = γ>1.
In this example, the contestants diﬀer only in one parameter. This pa-
rameter γ is a natural way to measure how diﬀerent the contestants are,
something which is considerably more complicated to do in the model with
general cost functions. Higher values of γ imply greater diﬀerences between
c o n t e s t a n t s .F u r t h e r ,t h e r ew i l la l w a y sb es o m es a b o t a g ei ne q u i l i b r i u m ,s i n c e
the ﬁrst unit of sabotage has zero marginal cost.
Proposition 3 Consider example 1.






l(n−2), if l ≥ 2,
1+
n(n−2)
n2−2n+2, if l =1 .
(5)


















holds, then existence of interior equilibria is ensured.
Proof. See appendix.
Inequality (6) serves to rule out problems related to possible non - con-
cavities of the objective function.7 It ensures that the objective functions
are concave enough. To give an example, if the error terms follow a Gumbel







, it can be shown that inequality (6)
holds if the variance of the error terms is high enough.
While proposition 3 conﬁrms the intuition that there will not be an in-
terior equilibrium if the contestants are very diﬀerent, it also shows that
contestants can diﬀer substantially and nevertheless have the same chance
of winning in equilibrium. For example, if there are two low cost and one
high cost contestant, then interior equilibria exist if γ ≤ 5
2. The high cost
c o n t e s t a n tc a nh a v eac o s tw h i c hi sm o r et h a nt w i c et h ec o s to ft h el o wc o s t
contestants, and still have the same chance of winning in the equilibrium!
The point that interior equilibria exist even if the contestants are quite dif-
ferent in their abilities can be expected to carry over to more general cost
functions.
The equilibrium is not unique. In fact, there is a continuum of interior
equilibria, where only the total amount of sabotage that contestant i =
1,...,n chooses (
P
j6=i sij), and the total amount of sabotage that contestant
i suﬀers (
P
j6=i sji) is determined. This can be illustrated as follows. Suppose
that every contestant i =1 ,...,n−1 sabotages contestant i+1one unit more,
and contestant n sabotages 1 more. In addition, i =2 ,...,nsabotages i − 1
one unit less and contestant 1 sabotages contestant n less. Then the total
7This problem is common in tournament models. See, among others, Lazear and Rosen
(1981), p. 845 fn. 2; Nalebuﬀ and Stiglitz (1983), p. 29; Lazear (1989), p. 565 fn. 3;
Kräkel (2000), p. 398 fn. 17; McLaughlin (1988), p. 236 and p. 241.
12amount of sabotage against any contestant is unchanged, and so are all the
marginal beneﬁts of working and sabotaging. Further, the total amount of
sabotage chosen by a contestant is the same as before, and so are the marginal
costs. Therefore, if the situation before was an equilibrium, then the new
situation is an equilibrium, too. Basically, the game is a coordination game
w h e r et h e r ea r em a n yw a y st oc o o r d i n a t e .
Proposition 3a implies that if the number of contestants is large, corner
solutions are more likely. This is as it should be expected. With many
contestants sabotage is less attractive, and therefore plays a less important
role. So the range of the parameter γ for which sabotage completely equalizes
promotion chances gets smaller.
Proposition 3a also shows that the case of a single low cost contestant
(l =1 )is diﬀerent from the other cases (l ≥ 2). The reason for this is as
follows. If l ≥ 2, and the contestants are very diﬀerent, then there will be a
corner solution where no one will sabotage a high cost contestant. On the
other hand, if l =1 , the low cost contestant will always sabotage high cost
contestants, because he has no other rivals. Here, in a corner solutions all
the high cost contestants sabotage only the single low cost contestant.
4P a r t i c i p a t i o n
An individual will participate in the tournament only if his utility from par-
ticipating exceeds his reservation utility. Once we take this into account, it
turns out that only less productive individuals may want to participate in the
tournament. I illustrate this point with the quadratic cost function example.
Assume that the conditions given in proposition 3 are fulﬁlled. In an












sij for all j 6= i. (8)
By proposition 1, we have pi = 1
n for all contestants i =1 ,...,n.T h e r e f o r e ,





















The more productive contestants will work harder (choose higher xi), and
sabotage more (choose higher
P
j6=i sij), than the less productive ones. But
they are also the victims of more sabotage, and therefore do not have a higher

















Note that u∗ (γi) increases in γi. That is, the contestants with the higher
costs have a strictly higher utility than the more productive contestants.
Further, in an interior equilibrium the utility of i does not depend on the
type of his rivals.
Even if all potential contestants have the same reservation utility ¯ u,i tc a n
happen that only the less productive ones will participate. This will happen
whenever the outside utility is greater than the utility of a low cost type but
less than the utility of a high cost type. To be more precise, consider the
following two stage model. In the ﬁrst stage potential contestants observe w
and n and then decide whether they want to participate. For those who do
not want to participate, the game ends and they get the outside utility ¯ u. If
fewer than n contestants want to participate, the game is over and everyone
gets ¯ u. If exactly n contestants want to participate, they play the tournament
in stage 2. Finally, if more than n want to participate, n of them are chosen
randomly and play the tournament, while the remaining get their outside
utility ¯ u.
Proposition 4 If participation in a selection tournament is endogenous,
there is a non-empty set of parameters such that the individuals with the
highest abilities stay out, and the tournament selects one of the least able
individuals with certainty.
14Proof. Consider example 1 and assume that the conditions given in
proposition 2 hold. Then a non-empty interval (u∗ (1),u ∗ (γ)) exists such
that if ¯ u ∈ (u∗ (1),u ∗ (γ)), only contestants with high costs will participate
in the tournament.
I tc o u l dbea r g u e dt h a ti ti sm o r el i k e l yf o rt h eh i g hp r od u c t i v ec o n t e s t a n t s
to have better outside opportunities, so their reservation utility should be
higher.8 This would make the kind of adverse selection considered in propo-
sition 4 even more likely.
Note that proposition 4 does not rely on a positive correlation between






for all i, where cS is an increasing convex function,
the contestants are equally able in sabotaging, but diﬀer in their productive
ability. Here it can also happen that the most productive contestants stay
out.
5 Extensions
This section considers some extensions to the basic model presented above.
Risk aversion. Suppose that the contestants are risk averse. Following
Rosen (1986) this can be modelled as follows. Let u(w) be some increasing
concave function and suppose








With some minor modiﬁcations to the proofs one can show that the results
derived above hold also with risk averse agents. Of course, in proposition 3
we have to replace w by u(w).
Production functions. The linear production functions considered so far
are a special case of the functions considered by Lazear (1989):
qi = q
¡
xi,s 1i,...,s (i−1)i,s (i+1)i,...,sni
¢
+ εi
8This seems reasonable when the outside option is (e.g.) to become self employed,
while it is more questionable if the outside option is to participate in another tournament,
where sabotage might be important, too.
15where q : Rn → R is a diﬀerentiable function that is increasing in its ﬁrst
argument and decreasing in the remaining arguments. Now the marginal






xj,s 1j,...,s (j−1)j,s (j+1)j,...,snj
¢





f (yij + εi)[Πl6=i,jF (yil + εi)]f (εi)dεi
| {z }
Bij
The ﬁrst factor (Aij) describes how much the expected output of contestant
j decreases, if i sabotages j more. The second factor (Bij) describes how
decreased expected output of j translates into a higher probability of winning
for contestant i. If the production function is linear in sabotage, the ﬁrst
factor Aij is equal to a constant, and lemma 1 and the propositions derived
above hold.
On the other hand, lemma 1 does not hold if the production function is
nonlinear in sabotage. Of course, if pj >p k, contestant i still improves his
chance of winning more if he decreases the output of j than if he decreases
the output of j by the same amount (that is, Bij >B ik). But Aij can be
g r e a t e ro rs m a l l e rt h a nAik.
I ﬁnd it hard to argue for speciﬁc assumptions on the production function.
For example, sabotage may have decreasing returns to scale. On the other
hand, there may be complementarities - it may more eﬀective to sabotage
k if k is sabotaged by other players as well. Without more speciﬁc assump-
tions, little can be said about the properties of equilibria. Nevertheless it
is important to note that there is no guarantee that better contestants will
have a better chance of winning in equilibrium.9
Easy victims. Some contestants may be easier to sabotage than others.
This can be due to personal diﬀerences between the contestants. People
diﬀer in their ability to cope with a hostile environment. Or it may be due
to diﬀerent positions or experience within the ﬁrm. For example, workers
that are relatively new depend more strongly on the help of other workers, if
9Chen (2003) works out an example with a speciﬁc nonlinear production function
where the best contestant does not have the highest chance of winning.
16only to get information about the job and the ﬁrm. They are therefore more
vulnerable to sabotage.
To capture this is in the model, I assume that
qi = xi − ai
X
j6=i
sji + εi (11)
where ai is a parameter. A high value of ai means that i is an easy victim.
Proposition 5 Suppose production functions are given by (11). In an inte-
rior equilibrium, contestant i has a higher chance of winning than contestant
j if and only if ai <a j.














f (ykj + ε)[Πl6=k,jF (ykl + ε)]f (ε)dε.
If ai <a j this implies
Z ∞
−∞




f (ykj + ε)[Πl6=k,jF (ykl + ε)]f (ε)dε








or pi >p j. Conversely, if ai ≥ aj, we get pi ≤ pj..
Proposition 5 says that people that are easy to sabotage will have lower
chances of winning in an interior equilibrium.10 The tournament will select
10Obviously, existence of interior equilibria will depend on the cost functions and on the
ai parameters.
17only on the basis of the ai parameters. If a1 <a 2 <. . .<a n,t h e np1 > ... >
pn. This may or may not be in the interest of the ﬁrm. In particular, there
is no reason to assume that low vulnerability to sabotage on the one hand
and ability to work productively on the other always go together.
By proposition 5, if two contestants behave equally in an equilibrium, the
one who is an easier victim will be sabotaged more heavily. As mentioned
in the introduction, this ﬁts to some results from the psychological literature
on mobbing or bullying. Basically, within the model there are two reason
why one might become a victim: by being an overachiever and therefore a
dangerous rival, and by being an easy victim. Both is in line with results
from psychology.
Cost functions. The cost function considered above depended only on the






where function ci is increasing in each argument and convex.
One natural assumption seems that the cost functions satisfy the following
symmetry property. A cost function ci is symmetric in the sabotage activities
if exchanging sij and sik while holding constant all other decision variables







, is symmetric in the sabotage activities, as is the following



















0 are diﬀerentiable, increasing, and
strictly convex functions.
In general, winning probabilities will not be completely equalized.12 How-
ever, some equalizing eﬀect is still at work. Proposition 2 - “overachievers”
are sabotaged more heavily - generalizes as follows.
11More formally, let π be any permutation of the opponents of player i (a bijection
of {1,..,i − 1,i+1 ,...,n} to {1,..,i − 1,i+1 ,...,n}). A cost function is symmetric in the














12This can easily be seen in the case that the cost function is given by (13) .
Suppose that in an interior equilibrium all contestants have the same chance of winning.
Then sabotaging j has the same marginal beneﬁtf o ri as sabotaging k. In an interior
equilibrium, this implies that the marginal costs have to be the same as well. Hence, if
18Proposition 6 Suppose that production functions are linear, and the cost
functions are as given in (12) and are symmetric in the sabotage activities.
a )I na n yp u r es t r a t e g ye q u i l i b r i u m ,i fxi − sji ≥ xj − sij,t h e n
P
k6=i,j ski ≥ P
k6=i,j skj.




Proof. a) Suppose xi − sji ≥ xj − sij in a pure strategy equilibrium.




k6=i,j skj.T h e n







In any pure strategy equilibrium, the following Kuhn Tucker conditions have






,s kl ≥ 0,
where one of the inequalities holds strictly.
Next I will show this implies ski ≥ skj. This is obvious if skj =0 . So













Cost functions that are convex and symmetric in the sabotage activities




∂skj.13 Hence from inequality
(15) we get ski ≥ skj.
the cost function is given by (13) and cS
i is strictly convex, it follows that sij = sik for all
i and j,k 6= i.T h e n E (qj) − E (qk)=xj − skj − (xk − sjk) since all other contestants
treat j and k equally. But in general xj −skj will not equal xk −sjk. Suppose for example
that j and k have the same cost of sabotaging, that is, cS
j (·)=cS
k (·). Then skj = sjk.
Since we assumed that all players have the same chance of winning, contestants j and k
have the same marginal beneﬁt from working productively. But if j has a lower marginal
cost of productive eﬀort , ∀x : ∂
∂xcX
j (x) < ∂
∂xcX
k (x), it follows that xj >x k and hence
E (qj) >E(qk), contradicting the assumption that all players have the same chance of
winning.
13This holds for all convex functions that are symmetric in the sense discussed here.
Let f (x,y) be any convex function. Since a convex function is underestimated by a linear




k6=i,j skj, a contradiction.
T h ep r o o fo fb )f o l l o w st h es a m el i n e sa n di so m i t t e d .
Proposition 6 says the following. Suppose that - looking only at the
decisions of contestants i and j - contestant i has a higher expected output
and a hence better chance of winning than contestant j (disregarding the
decisions of the other contestants). Then the other contestants will sabotage
i more heavily than j. In this sense, the eﬀect that sabotage tends to equalize
promotion chances is robust.
Proposition 6 also generalizes proposition 2 by taking corner solutions
into account. This is important since interior equilibria fail to exist if players
are very diﬀerent in their abilities. But as part a shows, the result that
overachievers are sabotaged more heavily is robust. Of course, it may happen
that both i and j a r en o ts a b o t a g e da ta l l .T h i n ko ft w op l a y e r st h a th a v e
much higher costs of working and sabotaging than all their rivals. They are
going to lose anyway - why should anyone bother sabotaging them?
Prize structure. In principle, in a rank order tournament there could
be n diﬀerent prizes corresponding to the n possible ranks. Dealing with
a general prize structure is an important challenge for future research, but
some important lesson can be learned by considering the case where there
are n−1 equal winner prizes w>0 and only one strictly lower loser prize of
0. In such a situation the probability that contestant i gets one of the winner







(1 − F (yij + ε))
!
f (ε)dε (16)
and his payoﬀ is given by








A st h ef o l l o w i n gl e m m as h o w s ,i nt h i ss i t u a t i o nt h ei n c e n t i v e st os a b o t a g e
are very diﬀerent from the case of one winner prize.
approximation, f (y,x) ≥ f (x,y)+f1 (x,y)(y − x)+f2 (x,y)(x − y), where fi denotes the
partial derivative with respect to the ith argument. If f satisﬁes the symmetry property
f (x,y)=f (y,x),we get 0 ≥ (f2 (x,y) − f1 (x,y))(x − y). It follows that y<ximplies
f2 (x,y) ≤ f1 (x,y)














It is instructive to compare lemma 2 with lemma 1. If there is a single
winner prize, then the biggest marginal beneﬁt from sabotaging comes from
sabotaging the opponent with the highest expected output. Here, with only
one loser, the biggest marginal beneﬁt of sabotaging comes from sabotaging
the opponent with the lowest expected output.
The intuition behind lemma 2 is as follows. Suppose there are three
contestants, and contestant 1 has the highest expected output, and contestant
3 the lowest. If contestant 2 sabotages 1, this increases his chance of winning
against 1. But winning against 1 is beneﬁcial only if player 2 does not win
against player 3 and therefore gets a winner prize anyway. Since 2 is likely to
win against 3 anyway, sabotaging 1 does not increase the chances of 2 to get a
prize by a great amount. On the other hand, by sabotaging 3 contestant 2 can
raise his probability of getting a prize by a greater amount, since 2 is likely
to lose against 1, and if 2 loses against 1 winning against 3 is important. The
assumption that f is log-concave is suﬃcient to guarantee that this intuition
carries over to the formal model.
Sabotage in equilibrium will take a very diﬀerent form with n−1 winner
prizes, as the next lemma shows.
Lemma 3 Suppose there are n−1 identical winner prizes and only one loser
prize. In a pure strategy equilibrium, each contestant sabotages exactly one of





l6=i,j slj for all j 6= i,k.
Proof. See Appendix.
According to this lemma, the behavior of the contestants in a pure strat-
egy equilibrium can be described as follows: Every contestant i sabotages
only the opponent who has the lowest chance of winning given the behavior
of all the other contestants j 6= i. As the next proposition shows, n−1 of the
contestants will choose to sabotage the same person. Call this contestant,
who is sabotaged by all other contestants, “the victim”.
21Proposition 7 Suppose there are n−1 identical winner prizes and only one
loser prize. In every pure strategy equilibrium, there exist one contestant a
(the victim) such that ska > 0 and skl =0for all k,l 6= a. Further, there
exists one contestant b such that sab > 0 and sak =0for all k 6= b. Moreover,
ˆ pa < ˆ pb < ˆ pk for all k 6= a,b.
Proof. We know that every contestant sabotages exactly one opponent.
For example, contestant 1 sabotages a contestant, say i1,t h a t i s , s1(i1) > 0.
From lemma 3, it follows that ˆ pi1 < ˆ pj for all j 6=1 ,i 1. Then we can show
that either i1 is the victim (see case 1 below), or 1 is the victim (case 2).
Case 1: ˆ pi1 < ˆ p1. Then i1 has the lowest chance of getting a prize: ˆ pi1 < ˆ pj
for all j 6= i1. Every j 6= i1 sabotages i1 (if there were j,k 6= i1 such that
sjk > 0 then by lemma 3 ˆ pk < ˆ pi1, a contradiction). In this case i1 is the
victim. Further, i1 sabotages someone, say contestant b. That is, si1b > 0.
Therefore, by lemma 3, ˆ pb < ˆ pk for all k 6= i1,b.
Case 2: ˆ pi1 > ˆ p1. B yt h es a m ea r g u m e n t sa si nc a s e1a b o v ei tf o l l o w s
that in case 2, sk1 > 0 for all k 6=1 , and ˆ p1 < ˆ pi1 <p k for all k 6=1 ,i 1. In
case 2 contestant 1 is the victim.
Case 3: ˆ pi1 =ˆ p1. Then ˆ pk > ˆ pi1 =ˆ p1 for all k 6=1 ,i 1 by lemma 3 and
s1(i1) > 0. Hence all the other players sabotage 1 or i1 (if sjl > 0 for some
j and l 6=1 ,i 1 then ˆ pl < ˆ pi1, a contradiction). But then it by lemma 3 it
cannot be true that ˆ pi1 =ˆ p1. So case 3 leads to a contradiction.
It remains to consider which contestant will be the victim. Typically,
there will be an equilibrium where the least able contestant is the victim.
But there can be multiple equilibria. This is very clear in the case of identical
contestants. Obviously, if a pure strategy equilibrium exists at all, then there
are multiple pure strategy equilibria, since everyone might be the victim.
By continuity, in the case of heterogenous contestants equilibria where all
contestants sabotage the most able one may exist. In such an equilibrium, the
most able player has the lowest chance of winning the tournament. However,
existence of pure strategy equilibria is not trivially ensured here.
Handicaps. Suppose that there are player speciﬁc handicaps as considered
by Lazear and Rosen (1981). That is, player i wins the contest if qi − di >
maxj {qj − dj}j6=i , where di is the handicap of player i. Returning to the
case of linear production functions, cost function (1), and a single winner
prize, the following generalization of lemma 1 can be shown by an argument
paralleling the proof of lemma 1:
22Lemma 4 Suppose that i wins if and only if qi − di > maxj {qj − dj}j6=i .




l6=j slj − dj >x k −
P
l6=k slk − dk






From lemma 4 it follows immediately that proposition 1 continues to
hold with handicaps as well. Of course, the existence of interior equilibria
now depends not only on the diﬀerences in ability, but on the handicaps as
well. Moreover, now those players whose expected output minus handicap
is highest are sabotaged most heavily. To sum up,
Proposition 8 With handicaps, in an interior equilibrium pi = 1
n and xi − P
l6=j sli − di = xk −
P
l6=k slk − dk for all i,k.
6I m p l i c a t i o n s
If sabotage plays an important role, it is better to limit the tournament to
only two contestants, since the equalizing eﬀect of sabotage depends on there
being at least three contestants.14 This is surprising because intuition would
suggest that more contestants should on average lead to higher quality of
winners. But here the strategic possibilities of the contestants change if there
more than two contestants, since then every contestant can direct sabotage
speciﬁcally against his most dangerous opponent.
One might think that a sequential elimination tournament as studied in
Rosen (1986) solves the problem that sabotage equalizes promotion chances.
In such a tournament, contestants are paired in each round. One winner
emerges from each pair and moves on to the next round. So in any given
round, each contestant has only one rival, and it might be thought that the
equalizing eﬀect of sabotage is not at work in such a sequential elimination
tournament. But contestants do not only care about moving on into the
next round, they are also interested in meeting weak rivals in the coming
14Hvide and Kristiansen (2003) ﬁnd a similar result in contests where the decision vari-
able of the contestants is risk taking.
23rounds. This gives them an incentive to interfere with the other paired
contests in any given round. Consider, for example, the incentives of the
semi-ﬁnalists. By helping the weaker contestant in the semi-ﬁnal contest in
which one is not directly involved, and by sabotaging the stronger ones, one
increases the probability of meeting a weaker rival in the ﬁnal round (if one
gets there). Therefore, there is some equalizing eﬀect of sabotage at work
also in a sequential elimination tournament.
Lazear (1989) has argued that by the right design of promotion tracks
contestants can be separated and thereby sabotage can be made more dif-
ﬁcult and hence less important (p. 557). Lazear’s point is that separating
contestants is good for the ﬁrm because sabotage decreases the valuable
output of the contestants. The results of this paper show that, in addition,
separating contestants also helps to make better promotion decisions. People
w h od on o tw o r kw i t he a c ho t h e rc l o s e l ya nd regularly are less likely to know
each other well, and so they cannot direct sabotage against their strongest
rivals. Therefore, the eﬀect that sabotage equalizes promotion chances does
not apply.
7C o n c l u s i o n
This paper studied sabotage in selection tournaments with heterogeneous
contestants. Sabotage can lead to equalization of promotion chances, even if
the contestants diﬀer a lot in their abilities. Furthermore it may happen that
only the least productive individuals participate. Therefore, using a tourna-
ment for selection can result in selecting (with probability one) someone who
is among the least productive.
The results are relevant for other types of contest as well. For example,
in rent seeking contests, yardstick competition between regulated ﬁrms, or
political election contests, sabotage can equalize the probabilities of winning
the contest. In rent-seeking contests, the heterogeneity between contestants
often takes the form of diﬀerent valuations of winning the contest. Applied
to this setting, the results of the paper imply that there is no guarantee that
the contestants with the highest valuations will win most often.
A related problem of tournaments in the presence of sabotage is that
sabotage reduces the incentives for productivity enhancing investments in
human capital. Since the contestants know that the better they are, the more
they will be sabotaged, they have little incentive to invest in their human
24capital. This adds to the potential severity of the problems described.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of lemma 1
The equivalence of a) and b) is obvious.























[f (yij + εi)F (yik + εi) − f (yik + εi)F (yij + εi)]
∗ [Πl6=i,j,kF (yil + εi)]f (εi)dεi. (17)
Now suppose xj−
P
l6=j slj >x k−
P
l6=k slk. This is equivalent to yij <y ik.
Since f (z) is strictly log-concave, f (z)/F (z) decreases strictly in z (see An
1998). It follows that
f (yij + εi)
F (yij + εi)
>
f (yik + εi)
F (yik + εi)



















The converse statement is proved similarly. Therefore, a) and c) are equiva-
lent as well.
8.2 Proof of stronger version of propositions 1 and 2
As stated in the text following proposition 2, it is possible to strengthen
propositions 1 and 2. We do not have to restrict attention to equilibria
where literally all contestants sabotage all their rivals.
1) If there are two contestants i,j who sabotage all their rivals, then it
follows that for all k 6= i,j: pk = pi (since j sabotages both k and i)a n d
pk = pj (since i sabotages both k and j). Therefore we have pk = pi = pj = 1
n.
2) Suppose in an equilibrium every contestant is sabotaged by two rivals.
That is, we have ∀i∃ji,k i : i 6= ji 6= ki 6= i,s(ji)i > 0 and s(ki)i > 0. Then
pi ≥ pl for all l 6= ji since i is sabotaged by ji. Also, since i is sabotaged by
ki, we have pi ≥ pl for all l 6= ki. Putting things together, pi ≥ pl for all l 6= i.
Since this holds for all i, we have pi = 1
n for all i =1 ,...,n.
3) If, in an equilibrium, we have s(k−1)k > 0, then it follows that pk ≥ pk+1,
since k − 1 sabotages k. Therefore, if the contestants can be renumbered so
that si(i+1) > 0 for i =1 ,..,n− 1 and sn1 > 0, we have p2 ≥ p3 ≥ ... ≥ pn ≥
p1 ≥ p2 or pi = 1
n for all i =1 ,...,n.
28In all those three cases, equation (4) holds. Therefore, proposition 2 also
generalizes: Contestants that choose higher productive eﬀort are sabotaged
more heavily.
8.3 Proof of proposition 3 part a)
The proof is by contradiction. Suppose there is a pure strategy equilibrium
with pi = 1










and denote the set of all low cost contestants by L, and the set of all high
cost contestants by H. The following ﬁr s to r d e rc o n d i t i o n sh a v et oh o l di n
the supposed equilibrium:
















for all i ∈ H. (21)





ski = xj −
X
k6=j
skj for all i and j. (22)




k6=j skj for all i,j ∈ L. That






skj =: Sl for all i,j ∈ L. (23)
In the same way it follows from equations (19) and (22) that all high cost






skj =: Sh for i,j ∈ H. (24)
29Now let us calculate Sl and Sh. Summing over equations (20) and (21)










γ (n − 1)
= lSl + hSh, (25)
where the second equality follows from equations (23) and (24). From equa-
tions (18) to (24) we get




Combining equations (25) and (26) we ﬁnally get
Sh = wg








l(n−2), equation (27) implies Sh < 0, a contradiction. This
completes the proof for the case l>1.
Note that the low cost contestants will be sabotaged more heavily:




If there is only one low cost contestant, this contestant directs all his
sabotage against high cost contestant. We can calculate the total amount of
sabotage that high cost contestants inﬂict on high cost contestants as the dif-
f e r e n c eo ft h et o t a la m o u n to fs a b o t a g es u ﬀered by high cost contestants, hSh,









n(n − 2) − (γ − 1)(n2 − 2n +2 )
γn(n − 1)
(29)
This is non-negative if and only if γ ≤ 1+
n(n−2)
n2−2n+2. This completes the proof.
308.4 Proof of proposition 3 part b)
This section develops the suﬃcient condition for the existence of interior pure
strategy equilibria in example 1. Existence is proved by direct construction



































Let us ﬁrst derive candidates for symmetric interior equilibria, and check
afterwards that they are really equilibria. In an interior equilibrium, the eﬀort
choices xi have to be given by equations (18) and (19). Further, a contestant
i ∈ H sabotages l low cost contestants and h−1 high cost contestants. The




sij = lshl +( h − 1)shh =
wg
γ (n − 1)
for all i ∈ H. (30)
The second equality follows from equation (21). Similarly
X
j
sij =( l − 1)sll + hslh =
wg
(n − 1)
for all i ∈ L.
The total amount of sabotage suﬀered by contestant i is
X
j
sji = lslh +( h − 1)shh = Sh if i ∈ H,
X
j
sji =( l − 1)sll + hshl = Sl if i ∈ L, (31)
where Sh and Sl are given by equations (27) and (28). Assuming l ≥ 2 and
h ≥ 2 (the remaining cases will be considered later) and using slh as a free
variable, the system of equations (30) to (31) can be solved to get
31sll =
wg






n − (γ − 1)l(n − 2)
γn(n − 1)(n − l − 1)
−
lslh
(n − l − 1)
, (33)
shl = wg
(2l + n(n − l − 2))(γ − 1)
γn(n − 1)(n − l)
+ slh. (34)






(n − 1)(n − l)
,wg




then all the variables given in equations (32) to (35) are non-negative.
In what follows, I show that, if the conditions given in proposition 2 are
satisﬁed, then there exists a continuum of symmetric equilibria given by (18),
(19), and (32) to (35). In all these equilibria, pi = 1
n for all contestants i.
Consider the maximization problem of contestant i, given that the other
contestants behave according to one of these candidate equilibria. Contestant
i chooses
¡
xi,s i1,...,s i(i−1),s i(i+1),...,sin
¢
to maximize ui, subject to the non-
negativity constraints xi ≥ 0 and sij ≥ 0 for all j 6= i.A saﬁrst step, I will
ignore for the moment the constraints and solve the unconstrained problem.
We will check afterwards whether the constraints are satisﬁed.
The unconstrained problem certainly has a solution. This can be seen
as follows. It is never optimal to choose very high values of the decision
variables. Therefore we can consider the problem
maximize ui s.t. − k ≤ xi ≤ k and − k ≤ sij ≤ k for all j 6= i (36)
for some suﬃciently high k ∈ R. By the Weierstrass theorem, a solution to
problem (36) exists. If k is high enough, the solution to problem (36) also
solves the unconstrained problem.
Ad i ﬃculty in ﬁnding the solution is that the objective function might
be non-concave, and checking concavity for a n-dimensional optimization
problem is quite cumbersome. The following lemma allows the n-dimensional
optimization problem to be reduced to a one-dimensional one:
32Lemma 5 Let l ≥ 2 and h ≥ 2. Suppose all contestants except i behave
symmetrically according to equations (18), (19), and (32) to (35). In the
optimum of the unconstrained optimization problem of contestant i, the fol-
lowing conditions have to hold.
a) Contestant i s a b o t a g e sa l lh i sl o wc o s tr i v a l se q u a l l y :
sij = sik =: sil for all j,k ∈ L,j,k 6= i,
and i also sabotages all his high cost rivals equally:
sij = sik =: sih for all j,k ∈ H,j,k 6= i.
b) Contestant i sabotages his high cost and his low cost rivals so that they
h a v et h es a m ec h a n c eo fw i n n i n g :
wg−(l − 2)sll −hshl −sil =
wg
γ −(l − 1)slh−(h − 1)shh −sih, if i ∈ L, and
wg − (l − 1)sll − (h − 1)shl − sil =
wg
γ − lslh − (h − 2)shh − sih,if i ∈ H.




(n − 1)((l − 1)sil + hsih), if i ∈ L,
(n − 1)(lsil +( h − 1)sih), if i ∈ H.
Proof. a) Suppose there are j,k ∈ L (j,k 6= i) such that sij >s ik. Since
j and k are treated in the same way by all other contestants, and choose the
same xj = xk = wg, this implies yij >y ik. Now contestant i could decrease
sij a little and increase sik by the same amount. By lemma 1, this increases
pi, while the costs of contestant i are unchanged. Therefore, it cannot be
optimal to choose sij >s ik.
The case j,k ∈ H a n dp a r tb )a r ep r o v e di nt h es a m ew a ya sa ) .P a r tc )
is obvious from a) and b).


















In the optimum of the unconstrained problem, the ﬁrst order conditions
w
∂pi




j6=i sij have to hold with equality. Putting
33things together, xi =( n − 1)
P
j6=i sij. Finally, using a) completes the proof.
This lemma establishes that, in the optimum of the unconstrained prob-
lem, certain relations between si1,...,sin and xi must hold. It allows the
unconstrained problem to expressed as a one-dimensional problem, where
contestant i maximizes only over xi. Denote the objective function in this
reduced problem by ˆ ui (xi).





F (b(xi − wg)+ε)






where b := 1 + 1
(n−1)2.
Lemma 6 If inequality (6) holds, ˆ ui (xi) is strictly concave.














































F (z + ε)
n−1 f (ε)dε





Therefore, inequality (38) is equivalent to inequality (6).
By this lemma, the solution to maxxi ˆ ui (xi) can be found simply as the
solution of the ﬁrst order condition
dˆ ui(xi)
dxi =0 , which is, of course, unique
and as given by equation (18): xi = wg.
By using lemma 5 we can verify that sij = sll for all j ∈ L (where sll is
g i v e ni n( 3 2 ) ) ,a n dsij = slh for all j ∈ H, solve the unconstrained maximiza-
tion problem of contestant i. Again, these calculations are straightforward
but tedious and hence omitted.
Finally, we have to check whether all decision variables satisfy the non-
negativity constraints. This is guaranteed by the condition γ ≤ 1+ n
l(n−2).
34Therefore, we have shown that no i ∈ L has an incentive to deviate from any
of the symmetric candidate equilibria.
I nt h es a m ew a yi tc a nb es h o w nt h a tn oi ∈ H has an incentive to




































The only diﬀerence from inequality (6) is the γ on the right hand side. Since
γ>1, if (6) holds, so does (39). This completes the proof of proposition 2
for the case that l ≥ 2 and h ≥ 2.
The two remaining cases where there is only one low cost contestant or
only one high cost contestant can be dealt with similarly. In these cases there















Of course, shh is non-negative if, and only if, the inequality given in propo-
sition 2a for the case l =1holds. Also note that, as it must be the case,




j∈H,j6=i sij where the right hand side is given in equa-
tion (29) above.
Finally, if h =1 ,
shl =
wg
γ (n − 1)
2,
sll = wg
(2γ − 1)(n − 1)
2 − 1
γn(n − 1)
2 (n − 2)
,
slh = wg
n − (γ − 1)(n − 1)(n − 2)
γn(n − 1)(n − 1)
.
358.5 Proof of lemma 2







































(1 − F (yil + ε))
!
f (ε)dε
Now suppose xj −
P
l6=j slj <x k −
P
l6=k slk. This is equivalent to yij >y ik. If
f is log-concave, the hazard rate function f (z)/(1 − F (z)) is monotonically
increasing in z (see An 1998). Therefore
f (yij + ε)(1− F (yik + ε)) >f(yik + ε)(1− F (yij + ε))


















The converse statement can be shown by a similar argument.
8.6 Proof of lemma 3
Lemma 3. Suppose there are n−1 identical winner prizes and only one loser
prize. In a pure strategy equilibrium, each contestant sabotages exactly one





l6=i,j slj for all j 6= i,k.
36Proof. In a pure strategy equilibrium, the following Kuhn Tucker condi-












∂sij =0 , every contestant will sabotage at least
one opponent. For if
P




∂sij ≤ 0. But the marginal cost of sabotage are zero if
P
j6=i sij =0 ,
and
∂ˆ pi
∂sij > 0. Therefore every contestant sabotages at least one opponent.
In what follows I show that no contestant sabotages more than one op-
ponent. Suppose to the contrary that there are j,k 6= i such that sij > 0








∂sik, and by lemma 2
xj −
P
l6=j slj = xk −
P
l6=k slk, hence yij = yik.
Now consider what happens if i decreases sik to zero and increases sij
by the same amount. This wouldn’t change i0s cost. But (I claim) it would
increase his probability of getting a prize. Let
ˆ pi (sij,s ik)=1−
Z
[1 − F (yij + ε)]
2 (Πl6=i,j,k [1 − F (yil + ε)])f (ε)dε
denote i0s probability of getting a prize if i sabotages j by sij and k by sik
(remember yij = yik), and let
ˆ pi (sij + sik,0) = 1 −
Z
[1 − F (yij + sik + ε)][1 − F (yij − sik + ε)] ∗
(Πl6=i,j,k [1 − F (yil + ε)])f (ε)dε
denote i0s probability of getting a prize if he shifts all sabotage from k to j.
We have to show that ˆ pi (sij + sik,0) > ˆ pi (sij,s ik). Deﬁne
h(s)=
©
[1 − F (yij + ε)]





0 (s)=f (yij + s + ε)[1− F (yij − s + ε)]−[1 − F (yij + s + ε)]f (yij − s + ε)
If f is log-concave, the hazard rate
f(z)
1−F(z) is increasing in z15. Hence for all
s>0,
f (yij + s + ε)
[1 − F (yij + s + ε)]
>
f (yij − s + ε)
[1 − F (yij − s + ε)]
15See An 1998
37and therefore h0 (s) > 0 for all s>0. Since h(0) = 0 this implies that
h(s) > 0 holds for all s>0.
Now we can write
ˆ pi (sij + sik,0) − ˆ pi (sij,s ik)=
Z
h(sik)(Πl6=i,j,k [1 − F (yil + ε)])f (ε)dε
and since h(sik) > 0 it follows that ˆ pi (sij + sik,0) > ˆ pi (sij,s ik). This com-
pletes the prove that every contestant sabotages at most one of his opponents.
Next I show that if sik > 0 in an equilibrium, then ˆ pk < ˆ pj for all j 6= i,k in
this equilibrium. Towards a contradiction suppose that sik > 0 and ˆ pk ≥ ˆ pj,
or yik ≤ yij. Consider what happens if i decreases sik to zero and increases sij
by the same amount. This wouldn’t change i0s cost. But (I claim) it would
increase his probability of getting a prize. To see this, let
ˆ pi (sij,s ik)=1 −
Z
[1 − F (yij + ε)][1 − F (yik + ε)] ∗
(Πl6=i,j,k [1 − F (yil + ε)])f (ε)dε
denote i0s probability of getting a prize if i sabotages k by sik > 0 and j by
sik, and let
ˆ pi (sij + sik,0) = 1 −
Z
[1 − F (yij + sik + ε)][1 − F (yik − sik + ε)] ∗
(Πl6=i,j,k [1 − F (yil + ε)])f (ε)dε
denote i0s probability of getting a prize if he shifts all sabotage from k to j.
We want to show that ˆ pi (sij + sik,0) > ˆ pi (sij,s ik). Deﬁne
˜ h(s)={[1 − F (yij + ε)][1 − F (yik + ε)] − [1 − F (yij + s + ε)][1 − F (yik − s + ε)]}
By essentially the same argument as the one following equation (40) above
one can show that ˜ h(s) > 0 for all s>0.
Now we can write
ˆ pi (sij + sik,0) − ˆ pi (sij,s ik)=
Z
˜ h(sik)(Πl6=i,j,k [1 − F (yil + ε)])f (ε)dε
and since ˜ h(sik) > 0 it follows that ˆ pi (sij + sik,0) > ˆ pi (sij,s ik). This shows
that if sik > 0 ,t h e nˆ pk < ˆ pj for all j 6= i,k.
38Finally, I show that if sik > 0,t h e nxk −
P
l6=i,k slk ≤ xj −
P
l6=i,j slj for
all j 6= i,k. To see this, suppose that in an equilibrium we have sik > 0 and
xk−
P
l6=i,k slk >x j−
P
l6=i,j slj. From the considerations above we know that
we must have sij =0and xk −
P
l6=i,k slk − sik <x j −
P
l6=i,j slj .I c l a i m
that by decreasing sik to zero and increasing sij by the same amount, i can
increase the probability that he will get a prize.
Suppose that i decreases sik in two steps. In the ﬁrst step, sik is decreased








> 0 and sij is increased to
ˆ sij = sik − ˆ sik > 0. This does not change ˆ pi, since it only reverses the roles
of j and k.
After this change, we have xk −
P
l6=i,k slk − ˆ sik ≥ xj −
P
l6=i,j slj − ˆ sij or
pk ≥ pj. Now suppose i now decreases ˆ sik to zero and increases ˆ sij by the
same amount. By the considerations above, this raises ˆ pi.
9 Omitted calculations (not for publication)
9.1 With a Gumbel distribution, inequality (6) holds
if the variance of the error terms is high enough
In this section I study the case where the error terms follow a Gumbel (or







, and show that
inequality (6) holds if, and only if, the variance of the error terms is high
enough.
Obviously F is log-concave. With this distribution16
Z ∞
−∞
F (z + ε)


















F (z + ε)
n−1 f (ε)dε = e
z










To maximize this expression over z, ﬁr s tn o t et h a tw ec a n ,w i t h o u tl o s s
of generality, restrict ourselves to values of z that satisfy
n − 1 − e
z
σ > 0. (42)
16This and further results can be found in Anderson, dePalma and Thisse 1992.





































F (z + ε)
n−1 f (ε)dε =
k
σ2,








3 is a constant somewhat smaller than 0.1. It fol-
lows that inequality (6) holds if and only if
σ
2 >
n2 − 2n +2
(n − 1)
2 kw.
The variance of the Gumbel distribution is equal to var(ε)=σ2π2
6 . Therefore,











9.2 Derivation of equation (37)
Here I give a sketch of the derivation of the reduced problem of a low cost
player in the case l ≥ 2,h≥ 2.
From part a) of lemma 2 we can immediately reduce the optimization
problem of i to three dimensions:




F (yil + ε)












yil = xi − Sl − (wg − (l − 2)sll − sil − hshl),
40and




− (l − 1)slh − sil − (h − 1)shl
¶
.


























By lemma 4c), in the optimum pi =
R ∞
−∞ F (yil + ε)
n−1 f (ε)dε. We want
to ﬁnd an expression for yil that depends only on xi. U s el e m m a4 b )t oe x p r e s s
sih as a function of sil. Then substitute this into lemma 4d) and solve for
sil to express sil as a function of xi. Finally, plug the result into yil to get
yil = b(xi − wg).
This shows that the reduced problem of player i is indeed to maximize
the function ˆ ui (xi) g i v e ni ne q u a t i o n( 3 7 )a b o v e .
9.3 Proof of Proposition 6b
Suppose the costs functions are as given in (12) and symmetric in the sab-
otage activities. If the equilibrium is an interior equilibrium and xi − sji >





Proof. Suppose that xi−sji >x j−sij in an interior equilibrium. Towards




k6=i,j skj.T h e nE (qi) >E(qj)




















The next step is to show that this implies ski >s kj. To see this, write (as
an abbreviation)
ck (ski,s kj): =ck (xk,s k1,...,ski,s kj,...skn).
41Since a convex function is underestimated by a linear approximation,







By symmetry, ck (skj,s ki)=ck (ski,s kj). Hence


































, then ski >s kj. (44)





k6=i,j skj, a contradiction.
42